The same people in different organisations
Imagine that tomorrow the construction industry disappears. The companies, contracts and established ways of doing business all go with it. In their place, new companies emerge, each able to conceive an infrastructure asset, plan and design it, construct and commission it, and operate it throughout its life. Each employs the people needed to do this within one organisation.
Take a water treatment plant. The process engineers, civil designers, construction managers and operators work for the same enterprise. They have different responsibilities, and will disagree about the best way to meet them. The construction manager wants access to the site. The designer needs time to complete the design. The operator is concerned about maintaining treatment capacity while the new works are brought into service. These are real differences, but the company ultimately bears the consequences of the decisions they make together.
During construction, the team discovers that the proposed arrangement of a pipe gallery will make an essential item of equipment difficult to remove for maintenance. Changing it now will require some redesign and additional work. Leaving it as drawn will preserve the immediate construction budget but create an operational difficulty that the business will inherit for years.
The people involved have reason to consider what the alteration will cost and what it will achieve. The operator can explain the maintenance requirement, the construction team can assess the work involved, and the designers can develop an alteration. Commercial staff can weigh the additional expenditure against the future cost and disruption. The decision may be difficult, particularly if the project is already over budget, but transferring the cost between departments will not remove it from the company’s accounts.
Now divide precisely the same people among independent organisations. The owner will operate the plant. A consultant has designed it. A contractor is building it. Give each a conventional appointment or contract defining its scope, payment and liability, with each organisation firmly protecting its own commercial position. Leave their competence and personal integrity unchanged.
The pipe gallery problem now has further consequences. The designer needs to establish whether the original arrangement met the brief and whether the requested alteration is additional work. The contractor needs to know who will instruct the change, what it will be paid and how any delay will be treated. The owner needs to understand whether it is paying to correct an error or improve a requirement. A technically sensible alteration may expose one organisation to a loss while delivering most of its benefit to another.
Those enquiries are reasonable. They also change the conversation. An early suggestion can become evidence about responsibility. A willingness to help can be mistaken for acceptance of liability. People who would readily work through the problem as colleagues may become more guarded when their words and actions carry consequences for a separate employer.
I am not suggesting that placing everyone in one company would necessarily deliver a better plant. The comparison draws attention to how commercial boundaries affect the response to a problem. Part of construction’s difficulty with trust may lie in the arrangements within which capable, well-intentioned people are required to work. We need to examine those arrangements as well as the conduct of the people working under them.
The organisation behind the individual
Working for one company does not mean everyone trusts everyone else. Departments protect budgets and managers compete for resources. A construction team judged only on its capital expenditure might still resist the pipe gallery alteration, even if it would save the business money over the plant’s life. Common ownership gives management authority to resolve that conflict. It does not ensure that management will use it well.
The company can, however, assess the decision against its own interest in the completed asset. It can authorise extra design or construction expenditure because it expects to recover the benefit through lower operating costs. It does not have to negotiate with another business to obtain a share of that benefit before proceeding.
Coase (1937) examined why activities are coordinated within a firm rather than through separate market transactions. Both arrangements have costs, and there are limits to how much a firm can efficiently manage. For construction, his work provides a reason to examine the cost of coordinating work across contractual boundaries alongside the cost of managing it within one organisation.
Construction depends on specialisation. Few organisations could sensibly maintain every capability needed for every asset. Independent firms bring expertise and competitive discipline. We need to retain those advantages while allowing people to use their knowledge together when a decision depends on it.
An owner’s engineer may know from experience that the contractor’s manager is competent, honest and willing to help. That personal trust matters when a difficulty emerges. It does not give the manager authority to incur an unrecoverable cost, waive an entitlement or commit the employer to a change. The engineer may trust the person and still be uncertain about what the organisation will allow that person to do.
Personal trust also depends on the institutional arrangements within which people work. For this argument, I use structural support for trust to mean arrangements that make cooperation a reasonable commercial choice. A project manager needs confidence that an agreed decision will be authorised, that information shared openly will be handled fairly, and that the commercial consequences will be dealt with as agreed. Shared incentives can support that confidence, although they cannot establish anyone’s honesty or competence.
In a theoretical analysis informed by Swedish construction research, Kadefors (2004) argues that contractual rules can legitimise conduct that conflicts with ordinary expectations of a trustworthy partner. She also explains how incentives and close monitoring may encourage opportunism and distrust. This supports examining how control affects a relationship, rather than assuming that more control necessarily produces greater confidence.
The designer may be candid about the pipe gallery problem while carefully reserving its position on responsibility. The contractor may support the alteration while declining to proceed without an instruction. Neither response demonstrates a lack of integrity. Yet repeated exchanges of this kind can teach the parties to expect defensive correspondence whenever a problem arises. Eventually, they may approach the next discussion expecting an attempt to transfer responsibility before they have heard what the other party has to say.
Traditional contracting can condition distrust in this way without anyone intending it. Clear obligations can also support confidence, and people regularly cooperate effectively under conventional contracts. The difficulty arises where protecting the separate commercial position is rewarded more reliably than improving the project outcome. Asking individuals to trust one another leaves them to manage a conflict their organisations have created.
An alliance as a common enterprise
A project alliance offers a practical approximation of the imaginary company. Independent participants work through an integrated team and link their commercial returns to the project’s performance. NSW procurement guidance describes an alliance as an agreement between entities that work cooperatively and share risks and rewards (NSW Government, 2008). The participants can change the basis on which they work together without merging into one permanent business.
The Australian Government’s Guide to Alliance Contracting describes integrated teams, joint governance, collective risk management and best-for-project decisions, supported by returns linked to agreed outcomes. Risk is not necessarily shared equally. The owner can retain substantial exposure where other participants’ losses are capped, and alignment can weaken once those caps are reached (Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, 2015, pp. 9–12, 32–33, 62). The commercial framework therefore needs careful design.
For the pipe gallery, this allows the team to consider the redesign and construction work against the objectives and costs for which it is jointly responsible. The agreed scope and reward arrangements still matter. Where those arrangements support the alteration, the participants can benefit from resolving the problem together, with less reason to spend their effort negotiating who should recover the cost from whom.
The construction manager still needs confidence in the designer’s judgement. There is also a commercial reason to support a recommendation that improves the agreed project outcome. The manager can explain that decision to the employer on the same basis as to the project team.
An alliance normally covers a defined project or programme, rather than every stage of the asset’s life. The future operator and parts of the supply chain may sit outside its shared commercial arrangements. The team therefore needs to understand the operating requirements and reflect them in its objectives. Sharing a construction target will achieve little for the owner if it encourages a cheaper plant that costs more to maintain.
Collective responsibility still requires the team to understand what went wrong. If the design reviews failed to address maintenance access, that failure needs to be established and corrected. People remain responsible for the quality of their work. An investigation should help the team put the problem right and avoid repeating it, without every admission becoming the basis for a recovery claim.
In their exploratory study of a Dutch railway construction alliance, Laan et al. (2011) concluded that its initial conditions supported trust through the opportunities and incentives they created. They cautioned that positive trust dynamics do not develop automatically. The organisations deliberately selected key employees, encouraged informal interaction and promoted openness. The case supports the value of commercial alignment while showing the continuing work needed to build relationships.
Alliancing also requires a capable owner and careful assessment of cost. The national guide treats its suitability as a decision for the particular project, especially where uncertainty or the cost of transferring risk makes conventional allocation difficult (Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, 2015, pp. 39–42). A straightforward project with well-understood requirements may gain little from the additional effort. The single-company analogy explains the purpose of alignment; it does not make an alliance the right choice for every project.
Collaborative provisions and commercial alignment
NEC4 illustrates why we need to be precise about what a collaborative contract does. The Engineering and Construction Contract requires the parties to act in a spirit of mutual trust and cooperation. Its early warning procedures help them address emerging problems while they can still influence the consequences (NEC, n.d.).
Its commercial arrangements can also support cooperation. Under Option C, the client and contractor share cost savings or overruns against the target in the agreed proportions. The target can change through compensation events (Crees, 2024). NEC4 can therefore align financial interests as well as provide procedures for working together.
A target cost construction contract does not, by itself, bring an independently appointed designer or operator into the same reward structure. Compensation events and other provisions continue to distinguish the parties’ responsibilities. How far their interests align depends on the options, amendments and related appointments actually in place.
Secondary option X12 can support multiparty collaboration and incentives around common objectives. Other partnering arrangements can also sit alongside NEC contracts. Heaphy (2018) explains how the NEC4 Alliance Contract goes further, bringing the client and key supply chain partners under one contract, with an integrated delivery team and performance measured across the alliance. Most risk is shared, and claims between members are restricted, subject to limited exceptions. The distinction matters because it changes the commercial consequences of working together.
The practical difficulties extend beyond the contract. Gharouni Jafari, Mottee and Whyte (2025) drew on 27 interviews concerning Australian water infrastructure projects using NEC4. They identified problems with contract implementation, collaboration skills, and systems and processes across office and site teams. Practitioners described the burden of working on separate information platforms and maintaining their own systems alongside another organisation’s. These emerging findings show how organisational boundaries can obstruct everyday work under a collaborative contract. They do not establish that an alliance would perform better.
An early warning meeting can bring the right people together and still leave them unable to decide. The owner’s representative may need approval from elsewhere in the business. The contractor may have to justify a joint recommendation against a different internal financial measure. The designer may be outside both arrangements. What happens after the meeting depends on the authority and commercial obligations each person takes back to their own organisation.
In The Cost of Collaboration (Evans, 2026), I questioned a commercial baseline that accepts defensive administration as ordinary project expenditure, while requiring collaboration to justify its additional cost. The difficulty with trust offers a possible explanation. My argument is that we create conditions in which participants have reason to protect themselves from one another, then pay for the effort needed to work across those conditions.
Some of that effort will always be necessary. Independent organisations need to learn about each other, test information and agree how decisions will be made. Collaboration takes work even within a well-managed company. We add to that work where reporting lines, liabilities and incentives repeatedly undermine the relationships we ask people to build.
Consider again the additional design fee needed to alter the pipe gallery. If it will avoid substantial construction or operating cost, the project needs a way to assess and authorise it promptly. Where the organisation paying for the improvement receives none of the benefit, that consequence needs to be addressed. An expectation of goodwill will not resolve the commercial difficulty.
I find the single-company thought experiment useful because we already expect people with different expertise to work together within a business. When departmental interests prevent a sensible decision, we recognise a management problem. Dividing those people among independent firms changes their commercial obligations, but leaves the project just as dependent on their combined knowledge.
An alliance is one way of giving them a shared commercial reason to use that knowledge well. Other arrangements can support the same purpose. Whichever approach we choose, we need to consider what happens when someone identifies a problem and asks another organisation for help. Trust will depend on how people respond. Their response will depend, in part, on the conditions we have put around them.
Research & commentary
The Boundaries of Trust
If the construction industry were one company
Abstract
Trust in construction depends partly on the commercial arrangements within which people work. This article uses a thought experiment to examine that relationship. It imagines companies that conceive, design, construct and operate assets, then divides the same people among independent organisations with separate contractual obligations. Their competence and integrity remain unchanged, but their reasons for sharing information, accepting recommendations and committing resources may differ. Drawing on research into trust and collaboration, the article considers how project alliancing can approximate a common enterprise through integrated teams, shared objectives and collective risk and reward. It distinguishes those arrangements from NEC4’s collaborative management provisions, while recognising the financial alignment available through target cost and multiparty arrangements. The argument supports examining the conditions that make trust difficult and collaboration costly, without assuming that integration guarantees trust or that alliancing suits every project.
The same people in different organisations
Imagine that tomorrow the construction industry disappears. The companies, contracts and established ways of doing business all go with it. In their place, new companies emerge, each able to conceive an infrastructure asset, plan and design it, construct and commission it, and operate it throughout its life. Each employs the people needed to do this within one organisation.
Take a water treatment plant. The process engineers, civil designers, construction managers and operators work for the same enterprise. They have different responsibilities, and will disagree about the best way to meet them. The construction manager wants access to the site. The designer needs time to complete the design. The operator is concerned about maintaining treatment capacity while the new works are brought into service. These are real differences, but the company ultimately bears the consequences of the decisions they make together.
During construction, the team discovers that the proposed arrangement of a pipe gallery will make an essential item of equipment difficult to remove for maintenance. Changing it now will require some redesign and additional work. Leaving it as drawn will preserve the immediate construction budget but create an operational difficulty that the business will inherit for years.
The people involved have reason to consider what the alteration will cost and what it will achieve. The operator can explain the maintenance requirement, the construction team can assess the work involved, and the designers can develop an alteration. Commercial staff can weigh the additional expenditure against the future cost and disruption. The decision may be difficult, particularly if the project is already over budget, but transferring the cost between departments will not remove it from the company’s accounts.
Now divide precisely the same people among independent organisations. The owner will operate the plant. A consultant has designed it. A contractor is building it. Give each a conventional appointment or contract defining its scope, payment and liability, with each organisation firmly protecting its own commercial position. Leave their competence and personal integrity unchanged.
The pipe gallery problem now has further consequences. The designer needs to establish whether the original arrangement met the brief and whether the requested alteration is additional work. The contractor needs to know who will instruct the change, what it will be paid and how any delay will be treated. The owner needs to understand whether it is paying to correct an error or improve a requirement. A technically sensible alteration may expose one organisation to a loss while delivering most of its benefit to another.
Those enquiries are reasonable. They also change the conversation. An early suggestion can become evidence about responsibility. A willingness to help can be mistaken for acceptance of liability. People who would readily work through the problem as colleagues may become more guarded when their words and actions carry consequences for a separate employer.
I am not suggesting that placing everyone in one company would necessarily deliver a better plant. The comparison draws attention to how commercial boundaries affect the response to a problem. Part of construction’s difficulty with trust may lie in the arrangements within which capable, well-intentioned people are required to work. We need to examine those arrangements as well as the conduct of the people working under them.
The organisation behind the individual
Working for one company does not mean everyone trusts everyone else. Departments protect budgets and managers compete for resources. A construction team judged only on its capital expenditure might still resist the pipe gallery alteration, even if it would save the business money over the plant’s life. Common ownership gives management authority to resolve that conflict. It does not ensure that management will use it well.
The company can, however, assess the decision against its own interest in the completed asset. It can authorise extra design or construction expenditure because it expects to recover the benefit through lower operating costs. It does not have to negotiate with another business to obtain a share of that benefit before proceeding.
Coase (1937) examined why activities are coordinated within a firm rather than through separate market transactions. Both arrangements have costs, and there are limits to how much a firm can efficiently manage. For construction, his work provides a reason to examine the cost of coordinating work across contractual boundaries alongside the cost of managing it within one organisation.
Construction depends on specialisation. Few organisations could sensibly maintain every capability needed for every asset. Independent firms bring expertise and competitive discipline. We need to retain those advantages while allowing people to use their knowledge together when a decision depends on it.
An owner’s engineer may know from experience that the contractor’s manager is competent, honest and willing to help. That personal trust matters when a difficulty emerges. It does not give the manager authority to incur an unrecoverable cost, waive an entitlement or commit the employer to a change. The engineer may trust the person and still be uncertain about what the organisation will allow that person to do.
Personal trust also depends on the institutional arrangements within which people work. For this argument, I use structural support for trust to mean arrangements that make cooperation a reasonable commercial choice. A project manager needs confidence that an agreed decision will be authorised, that information shared openly will be handled fairly, and that the commercial consequences will be dealt with as agreed. Shared incentives can support that confidence, although they cannot establish anyone’s honesty or competence.
In a theoretical analysis informed by Swedish construction research, Kadefors (2004) argues that contractual rules can legitimise conduct that conflicts with ordinary expectations of a trustworthy partner. She also explains how incentives and close monitoring may encourage opportunism and distrust. This supports examining how control affects a relationship, rather than assuming that more control necessarily produces greater confidence.
The designer may be candid about the pipe gallery problem while carefully reserving its position on responsibility. The contractor may support the alteration while declining to proceed without an instruction. Neither response demonstrates a lack of integrity. Yet repeated exchanges of this kind can teach the parties to expect defensive correspondence whenever a problem arises. Eventually, they may approach the next discussion expecting an attempt to transfer responsibility before they have heard what the other party has to say.
Traditional contracting can condition distrust in this way without anyone intending it. Clear obligations can also support confidence, and people regularly cooperate effectively under conventional contracts. The difficulty arises where protecting the separate commercial position is rewarded more reliably than improving the project outcome. Asking individuals to trust one another leaves them to manage a conflict their organisations have created.
An alliance as a common enterprise
A project alliance offers a practical approximation of the imaginary company. Independent participants work through an integrated team and link their commercial returns to the project’s performance. NSW procurement guidance describes an alliance as an agreement between entities that work cooperatively and share risks and rewards (NSW Government, 2008). The participants can change the basis on which they work together without merging into one permanent business.
The Australian Government’s Guide to Alliance Contracting describes integrated teams, joint governance, collective risk management and best-for-project decisions, supported by returns linked to agreed outcomes. Risk is not necessarily shared equally. The owner can retain substantial exposure where other participants’ losses are capped, and alignment can weaken once those caps are reached (Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, 2015, pp. 9–12, 32–33, 62). The commercial framework therefore needs careful design.
For the pipe gallery, this allows the team to consider the redesign and construction work against the objectives and costs for which it is jointly responsible. The agreed scope and reward arrangements still matter. Where those arrangements support the alteration, the participants can benefit from resolving the problem together, with less reason to spend their effort negotiating who should recover the cost from whom.
The construction manager still needs confidence in the designer’s judgement. There is also a commercial reason to support a recommendation that improves the agreed project outcome. The manager can explain that decision to the employer on the same basis as to the project team.
An alliance normally covers a defined project or programme, rather than every stage of the asset’s life. The future operator and parts of the supply chain may sit outside its shared commercial arrangements. The team therefore needs to understand the operating requirements and reflect them in its objectives. Sharing a construction target will achieve little for the owner if it encourages a cheaper plant that costs more to maintain.
Collective responsibility still requires the team to understand what went wrong. If the design reviews failed to address maintenance access, that failure needs to be established and corrected. People remain responsible for the quality of their work. An investigation should help the team put the problem right and avoid repeating it, without every admission becoming the basis for a recovery claim.
In their exploratory study of a Dutch railway construction alliance, Laan et al. (2011) concluded that its initial conditions supported trust through the opportunities and incentives they created. They cautioned that positive trust dynamics do not develop automatically. The organisations deliberately selected key employees, encouraged informal interaction and promoted openness. The case supports the value of commercial alignment while showing the continuing work needed to build relationships.
Alliancing also requires a capable owner and careful assessment of cost. The national guide treats its suitability as a decision for the particular project, especially where uncertainty or the cost of transferring risk makes conventional allocation difficult (Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, 2015, pp. 39–42). A straightforward project with well-understood requirements may gain little from the additional effort. The single-company analogy explains the purpose of alignment; it does not make an alliance the right choice for every project.
Collaborative provisions and commercial alignment
NEC4 illustrates why we need to be precise about what a collaborative contract does. The Engineering and Construction Contract requires the parties to act in a spirit of mutual trust and cooperation. Its early warning procedures help them address emerging problems while they can still influence the consequences (NEC, n.d.).
Its commercial arrangements can also support cooperation. Under Option C, the client and contractor share cost savings or overruns against the target in the agreed proportions. The target can change through compensation events (Crees, 2024). NEC4 can therefore align financial interests as well as provide procedures for working together.
A target cost construction contract does not, by itself, bring an independently appointed designer or operator into the same reward structure. Compensation events and other provisions continue to distinguish the parties’ responsibilities. How far their interests align depends on the options, amendments and related appointments actually in place.
Secondary option X12 can support multiparty collaboration and incentives around common objectives. Other partnering arrangements can also sit alongside NEC contracts. Heaphy (2018) explains how the NEC4 Alliance Contract goes further, bringing the client and key supply chain partners under one contract, with an integrated delivery team and performance measured across the alliance. Most risk is shared, and claims between members are restricted, subject to limited exceptions. The distinction matters because it changes the commercial consequences of working together.
The practical difficulties extend beyond the contract. Gharouni Jafari, Mottee and Whyte (2025) drew on 27 interviews concerning Australian water infrastructure projects using NEC4. They identified problems with contract implementation, collaboration skills, and systems and processes across office and site teams. Practitioners described the burden of working on separate information platforms and maintaining their own systems alongside another organisation’s. These emerging findings show how organisational boundaries can obstruct everyday work under a collaborative contract. They do not establish that an alliance would perform better.
An early warning meeting can bring the right people together and still leave them unable to decide. The owner’s representative may need approval from elsewhere in the business. The contractor may have to justify a joint recommendation against a different internal financial measure. The designer may be outside both arrangements. What happens after the meeting depends on the authority and commercial obligations each person takes back to their own organisation.
In The Cost of Collaboration (Evans, 2026), I questioned a commercial baseline that accepts defensive administration as ordinary project expenditure, while requiring collaboration to justify its additional cost. The difficulty with trust offers a possible explanation. My argument is that we create conditions in which participants have reason to protect themselves from one another, then pay for the effort needed to work across those conditions.
Some of that effort will always be necessary. Independent organisations need to learn about each other, test information and agree how decisions will be made. Collaboration takes work even within a well-managed company. We add to that work where reporting lines, liabilities and incentives repeatedly undermine the relationships we ask people to build.
Consider again the additional design fee needed to alter the pipe gallery. If it will avoid substantial construction or operating cost, the project needs a way to assess and authorise it promptly. Where the organisation paying for the improvement receives none of the benefit, that consequence needs to be addressed. An expectation of goodwill will not resolve the commercial difficulty.
I find the single-company thought experiment useful because we already expect people with different expertise to work together within a business. When departmental interests prevent a sensible decision, we recognise a management problem. Dividing those people among independent firms changes their commercial obligations, but leaves the project just as dependent on their combined knowledge.
An alliance is one way of giving them a shared commercial reason to use that knowledge well. Other arrangements can support the same purpose. Whichever approach we choose, we need to consider what happens when someone identifies a problem and asks another organisation for help. Trust will depend on how people respond. Their response will depend, in part, on the conditions we have put around them.
References
Coase, R.H. (1937) ‘The nature of the firm’, Economica, 4(16), pp. 386–405. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x
Crees, J. (2024) ‘NEC4 ECC pricing provisions – an introduction for new NEC users’, NEC, 18 June. Available at: https://www.neccontract.com/news/nec4-ecc-pricing-provisions-%E2%80%93-an-introduction-for-new-nec-users (Accessed: 17 October 2026).
Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development (2015) National Alliance Contracting Guidelines: Guide to Alliance Contracting. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia. Available at: https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/sites/default/files/migrated/infrastructure/ngpd/files/National_Guide_to_Alliance_Contracting.pdf (Accessed: 17 October 2026).
Evans, S. (2026) ‘The cost of collaboration’, Concordia Resolution, 15 October. Available at: https://concordiaresolution.com/articles/the-cost-of-collaboration/ (Accessed: 17 October 2026).
Gharouni Jafari, K., Mottee, L. and Whyte, J. (2025) ‘Collaborating between the construction office and the construction site under collaborative contracts’, in GhaffarianHoseini, A., Ghaffarianhoseini, A., Rahimian, F. and Babu Purushothaman, M. (eds) Proceedings of the International Conference on Smart and Sustainable Built Environment (SASBE 2024). Lecture Notes in Civil Engineering, 591. Singapore: Springer, pp. 526–533. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-96-4051-5_51
Heaphy, I. (2018) ‘Introducing the new NEC4 Alliance Contract’, NEC, 2 July. Available at: https://www.neccontract.com/news/introducing-the-new-nec4-alliance-contract (Accessed: 17 October 2026).
Kadefors, A. (2004) ‘Trust in project relationships—inside the black box’, International Journal of Project Management, 22(3), pp. 175–182. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0263-7863(03)00031-0
Laan, A., Noorderhaven, N.G., Voordijk, H. and Dewulf, G. (2011) ‘Building trust in construction partnering projects: An exploratory case-study’, Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 17(2), pp. 98–108. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pursup.2010.11.001
NEC (n.d.) ‘NEC4: Engineering and Construction Contract’. Available at: https://www.neccontract.com/products/contracts/nec4/engineering-and-construction-contract/ecc (Accessed: 17 October 2026).
NSW Government (2008) ‘Construction procurement guide: contract systems’, info.buy.nsw, updated 1 July. Available at: https://www.info.buy.nsw.gov.au/resources/construction/construction-procurement-guide-contract-systems (Accessed: 17 October 2026).
This article is intended to provide general commentary and insights on construction, commercial and dispute resolution matters. It is not legal, contractual or professional advice and should not be relied upon as such. Specific advice should always be sought in relation to individual projects and circumstances.
Steven Evans
Further reading
All articles →Construction Contracts: Risk Allocation Is Not Risk Management
NEC4: Integrating Early Warning with Project Risk Management
NEC4: When the Project Manager Lacks Authority